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Abstract 
 
Automotive transport represents one of the highest contributing sources of oil use, local 
air pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions. Several countries, notably including several 
European countries and China, have proposed bans on the sale of automotive internal 
combustion engine (ICE) vehicles as a means to abate these negative effects from the 
sector. Some cities and regions have already instituted restrictions on ICE vehicles. 
Larger, national bans have been discussed as a policy to begin in 2040. We consider the 
literature on proposed policies to ban ICE vehicles and develop scenarios to estimate 
the potential impacts of these proposed bans, to contribute to a peaking in oil demand 
and eventual reductions in CO2 emissions. We find that national level ICE car bans in key 
markets such as China and Europe in 2040 could reduce oil use by five million barrels a 
day (b/d) by 2050, under five percent of projected global oil use. A global ban would 
eliminate three times that level of oil use but would likely take several decades for its 
full impact is realized. Our findings suggest that other supporting policies beyond the 
bans alone might be necessary to trigger more rapid changes in markets and purchase 
behavior.  
 
 
Key Points: 
 
• Proposed ICE sales bans could cut oil use by about 5 million barrels per day by 
2050. 
 
• National ICE sales bans will have delayed impacts because of decadal nature of 
car stock turnover rates, and thus are sensitive to implementation date. 
 
• A global ICE sales ban could cut oil use by over 15 million barrels a day over a 
20 year period.  
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Abbreviations 
2DS, two degree scenario 
4DS, 4 Degree Scenario 
ASEAN, Association of South East Asian Nations 
b/d, barrels per day 
CO2, carbon dioxide 
CO2e, carbon-dioxide-equivalent GHG emissions 
EJ, exajoules 
EPA, Environmental Protection Agency 
EU, European Union 
f, fuels 
GDP, gross domestic product 
GHG, greenhouse gas 
ICE, internal combustion engine  
iCET, Innovation Center for Energy and Transportation 
IEA, International Energy Agency 
Km^2, square kilometers  
LDV, light-duty vehicle 
m, modes 
Mboe/d, million barrels of oil equivalent per day 
MoMo, Mobility Model 
Mmbd, million barrels per day 
Mtonnes CO2eq, million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
NDC, Nationally Determined Contributions 
NO2, nitrogen dioxide 
OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OEM, original equipment manufacturer 
PEV, plug-in electric (and plug-in hybrid electric) vehicle 
Pkm/y, passenger kilometer miles per year 
PLDV, passenger light duty vehicles 
ROW, rest of world 
RTS, reference technology scenario 
SAV, shared autonomous vehicle 
Vkt, vehicle kilometers traveled 
WTW, well to wheel   
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1. Introduction 
Several countries around the globe have announced plans to ban sales of automotive 
internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles after 2040 as a key policy to reduce air 
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.  Patrick Plotz et al suggest in a recent survey on 
designing ICE car bans that ICE vehicles need to be banned completely by 2035 or 2040 
to “align with deep GHG-reduction goals.” Plotz et al (2019) note that since new 
passenger vehicles tend to be used for fifteen years or longer (oftentimes across 
multiple owners and countries), ICE car bans need to be implemented suitably early and 
convincingly to ensure companies develop sufficient alternative fuel vehicle model lines, 
supply chains, and manufacturing expertise. The International Energy Agency (IEA), Ford 
Motor Company, and others have published glide paths that show that sales of ICE cars 
must fall to close to zero by 2050 to remain consistent with a 2 degrees C warming 
scenario (IEA 2017, Ford Motor Company 2019, Kodjak 2019).  For automotive original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), this implies expansion of adequate manufacturing 
capacity and key supply chains to meet the rapidly rising demand for plug-in electric and 
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PEVs), (we refer to PEVs broadly to include also fuel cell 
vehicles that do not require charging by plug-in), theorized in a glide path to zero ICE 
sales.  For governments, this implies supporting the transition away from incumbent ICE 
cars to PEVs through education, electric recharging infrastructure expansion, supply and 
demand side sales incentives, and fuel price regulation including fuel taxes and 
environmental performance standards. 
 
In practice, details regarding how such bans would be implemented remain vague. A 
recent study on how to implement a national ban in China suggests a phased approach 
could be necessary. Innovation Center for Energy and Transportation (iCET), a leading 
Chinese and U.S. think tank focused on Chinese environmental policy sponsored China 
Oil Consumption Cap Plan and Policy Research Project, which has an advisory role to 
government policy makers in China, recently unveiled a discussion paper on China’s 
timetable and possible methodology to phase out traditional ICE engine vehicles (iCET, 
2019). China’s automotive policies are highly influential because China represents the 
largest car market in the world, with total sales of over 23.6 million light duty cars in 
2018. Automobiles accounted for over forty percent of China’s total oil consumption in 
2018. To-date, China’s Dual Credit policy, concurrent with PEV sales quotas and relaxed 
consumer PEV purchase regulations have brought China’s PEV industry into a leading 
position globally. Going further, China’s Hainan province has officially announced it will 
ban ICE vehicles by 2030. China is investing heavily in new energy vehicles, including 
PEVs, which have been receiving subsidies and other support to meet China’s energy 
saving, air quality, and decarbonization goals. The Chinese study suggests Beijing will 
want to implement the ban in stages, starting in major cities and eventually reaching 
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across the country. Vehicles used for ride sharing and municipal fleets would be 
regulated first, followed by private passenger cars, iCET suggests.  
 
Other regions are taking a different approach. For example, British Columbia has 
instituted an electric vehicle mandate as an interim step to its new law to end new sales 
of ICE engines by 2040. Oslo, Norway is the first city to implement an ICE ban in its 
center city. Other cities including London, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Seattle, and Hainan, 
China, have citywide bans planned for 2030. National level bans, if fully implemented 
and successful, would supersede city level policies. Expectations that over 80 percent of 
the global population may live in cities by 2050 (Rose, 2016) leaves room for city level 
bans in countries that do not have a national ban to have significant impact as well. 
Many other cities are investigating how to cut both the numbers and impacts of vehicles 
to reduce air pollution and congestion. (O’Shaughnessy, et al, 2016) 
 
As shown in Figure 1, many countries including France, the U.K., India, and China, have 
made announcements regarding future restrictions on new sales of ICE cars by 2040 or 
sooner. Reduction or outright bans of ICE cars in city centers are also catching on in 
many locations (Garfield, 2018). A number of major cities have pledged to restrict diesel 
and gasoline ICE vehicles between 2024 and 2040 (IEA, 2018). Even U.S. legislators have 
proposed bills banning on gasoline ICE engine vehicles, though passage is not yet 
considered politically viable (Hawkins, 2019)  
 
Figure 1. Intended Bans on Internal Combustion Engines 
 
Source: Burch, I. and Gilchrist, J. 2018. “Survey of Global Activity to Phase Out Internal Combustion Engine 
Vehicles,” Center for Climate Protection, https://climateprotection.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Survey-on-Global-Activities-to-Phase-Out-ICE-Vehicles-FINAL-Oct-3-2018.pdf  
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The question on what would replace ICE passenger vehicles is a contentious one. Some 
policy analysts argue that cities will need to strengthen public transit and increase the 
capacity for bike lanes and walking, if a ban on ICE engine cars is going to be possible 
(Fulton, 2017). Others expect large numbers of PEVs to be purchased to offset the 
elimination of ICE vehicles at both the city and national level. These could include much 
larger numbers of ride-hailing fleet vehicles and/or automated vehicles, as long as they 
were not ICE vehicles.  Cumulative sales of PEVs reached 5 million in 2018. However, 
only a few regions, such as Norway, Beijing and parts of California, have significant 
electric vehicles sales as part of the emerging car stocks.  
 
A decline in the use of ICE vehicles, both for passenger cars and possibly commercial 
trucks, will have an impact on global oil use, which may peak at some point in the next 
two decades. Shifts away from oil use in light duty vehicles (LDVs) would likely speed 
this process.  The existing literature on peak oil demand focuses mainly on the role of 
energy efficiency and fuel switching in lowering demand for oil products (conventional 
oil production and unconventional oil production) by 2070 (Brandt et al, 2013). Brown 
and Huntington 2017 note the importance of reducing world oil demand as a means to 
enhance world oil security. Newman, Beatley, and Boyer 2009 argue that for cities to be 
resilient to climate change and other health challenges, they will need to reduce oil 
demand. 
 
To date, there are no large (>500,000 inhabitants) cities completely free of passenger 
light duty vehicles (PLDVs) (Nieuwenhuijsen and Khreis, 2016). Venice and the Medina 
of Fez in Morocco are among the best examples, but PLDV use in these cities is limited 
organically by practical constraints (Wright, 2005). Within the last few years, there has 
been growing interest among some cities in setting increasingly ambitious goals to 
restrict PLDVs from entering high-use areas such as city centers (often referred to as 
car-free zones or pedestrian zones). Hamburg was the first city to announce that it will 
be free of private car use by 2034 (Reuters, 2015). Norway’s capital, Oslo, quickly 
followed with a goal to become “car-free” by 2019. In reality, this policy restricts cars 
from only 1.9 km2 of Oslo’s downtown, in addition to an existing car-free waterfront 
promenade and central station. Similarly, Madrid has limited the number of visiting 
vehicles in its downtown and plans to completely pedestrianize its urban center 
(3.52km2) by 2020, though recent developments have called the viability of this program 
into question (Cathkart-Keays, 2015). In Europe alone, there are 32 cities considering 
implementation of a car-free zone (Tønnesen, 2016). 
 
Car-free zones are “proto-type” car free cities and in many cases, cities may simply 
extend these restrictions over time to cover more area. Cities may also specify to allow 
zero-emission vehicles into these zones (including bicycles, electric vehicles, and in some 
cases plug-in hybrid vehicles), thus making them potentially equivalent to ICE car bans.  
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In some cases, cities may eventually consider shifting to automated autonomous electric 
vehicles in geo-fenced areas. Some cities, like Las Vegas, Nevada, and Austin, Texas, are 
already experimenting with autonomous public buses. Pilots are also underway utilizing 
automated flying drone taxis that would travel from one rooftop to another, bypassing 
the street. The distinction between banning all cars and banning only ICE cars is of 
course very important in terms of its potential impacts.  Banning all cars is likely to have 
a major impact on mode choice; banning only ICE vehicles may have a mixed impact, 
affecting both mode choice and fuel choice.  Notably, in an ICE ban situation, battery 
electric and fuel cell vehicles would likely be permitted; plug-in hybrid vehicles may also 
be, especially if they can function in zero-emissions mode while in the affected zone as 
was studied by Ford Motor Company in London (Ford Motor Company, 2017). We 
include all these vehicle types in our use of the term PEV. 
 
National level car bans would obviously be the most definitive approach to altering 
future car stocks and could have by far the biggest impacts on sales of ICE vs non-ICE 
vehicle technologies (Spitzer, 2018). As is already happening with diesel bans in Europe, 
a top down approach might suggest car manufacturers would anticipate the coming 
restrictions and start to adjust their manufacturing and sales strategies accordingly. Car 
owners too would not likely want to buy cars of a technology that is being phased out 
for fear of rapid depreciation and possible dwindlingof access to repair services, spare 
parts, and fueling stations. Though not addressed directly by this report, it is worthy of 
note that many economies rely heavily on domestic and international auto 
manufacturing.  Thus, it may be less politically palatable for some governments to enact 
regulation that quickly changes ICE manufacturing jobs and endangers traditional auto 
parts supply chain businesses. We believe this is a pivotal reason why national ban 
announcements to date have been vague and aspirational in nature, except in countries 
that do not have significant domestic car industries.  
 
In this paper, we investigate how effective ICE car bans could be in eliminating oil use. 
We compare scenarios of partial phase-ins of bans to a globalized ban in various time 
frames and how this translates into reductions in oil use and related carbon dioxide 
emissions.  Finally, we examine whether bans alone are likely to result in a smooth glide 
path or whether other, complementary policies will have to be adopted alongside 
changes in passenger vehicle technology. We discuss those policies and subjects for 
future research. 
2. Methodology and Data 
For the analysis of the effects of ICE bans in this study, on a national and global level, we 
have developed scenarios and projections using a global vehicle sales and stock model, 
calibrated to align with the modeling framework used by the International Energy 
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Agency (IEA) in its widely-cited, complex Mobility Model (MoMo). Unlike MoMo, our 
tool is a relatively simplified stock adjustment model, including all light-duty vehicle 
sales and stock for 8 world countries and regions (adding up to global totals). Our 
modeling tool is informed by the methodology of the more complex and detailed MoMo 
model, which is described in Fulton et al, 2009. Our sales and stock model tracks new 
vehicle and average car stock technology types, energy efficiency, and typical travel 
levels.  Our approach is aimed to provide enough detail to understand how changes in 
future sales of LDVs by vehicle technology type will affect the stock and energy use by 
kind of energy (e.g. gasoline, diesel, electricity, hydrogen, etc.). Scenario calculations 
are, in turn, linked to vehicle efficiency, energy use, and CO2 emissions.  These 
calculations and projections are based on the “ASIF” methodology, which relates vehicle 
Activity, Stock, energy Intensity and Fuel carbon intensity (Schipper et al, 1999). More 
formally, this multiplicative relationship can be characterized as: 
 
𝐺𝐺 = � 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚,𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚,𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚,𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚,𝑓𝑓
𝑚𝑚,𝑓𝑓  
where A is the travel activity (e.g. kms) per vehicle, S is the vehicle stock, I is the 
energy use per km of driving for the average vehicle, and F is the CO2 emissions 
per unit fuel use. These are assessed across all modes (m) or vehicle types and all 
fuel types (f). The sum product of this equation is G, the total greenhouse gas 
emissions from all vehicles. (In this study only light-duty vehicles are considered, 
so other modes are excluded.)  
 
Using this framework, we were able to create scenarios where sales of ICE vehicles of 
different types are targeted for phase out by specific dates, with a glide path over a 10 
or 15-year period to zero.  Changes in these sales are then tracked through to stock 
changes, travel changes, and energy/CO2 impacts. We create a “business-as-usual” 
baseline scenario that builds off and aligns with assumptions and inputs from IEA’s 
published ETP (2017) Reference Technology Scenario (RTS), also called their 4 Degree 
Scenario (4DS) (IEA, 2017).  Like the IEA ETP, this baseline projection of car stocks and 
car travel takes into account policy changes, either enacted or expected to be enacted, 
within the near term. We refer to this reference case as the “Baseline”. We then 
consider and construct separate cases with much faster overall penetration of electric 
vehicles and other changes in efficiency, but within the same overall vehicle ownership 
projection in each country.   
 
In utilizing our stocks modeling tool, we started from Baseline projections of vehicle 
sales by vehicle type and region and utilized the sales and stock-turnover functions to 
adjust future sales by vehicle type and derive changes to the stock, energy use, and GHG 
emissions. In other words, new scenarios were constructed by altering our reference 
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case baseline, by changing specific assumptions regarding the sales (and energy 
technologies) of new vehicles at certain points in the future. We did not alter total sales, 
total stock, or travel per vehicle, though at a future date, scenarios that consider how 
autonomous technology or urban zoning might change these elements are a good 
subject for further research.  
 
It should be noted that there is considerable fuel efficiency improvement (though 
modest adoption of zero-emission vehicles) in the baseline scenario.  ICCT  (2019), 
among others, have found that substantial improvements in ICE passenger vehicle 
efficiency are still possible, with current emissions rates as high as 250 grams of CO2 per 
kilometer dropping to as low as 60 to 70 grams per kilometer (g/km) by 2030, which is 
now a formal EU target for LDVs (EU Commission, 2030). The ICCT study shows that such 
levels could be achieved just with non-ICE vehicle penetration. An earlier ICCT study 
(Meszler et al, 2016) indicates that passenger vehicle standards as low as 40 g/km can 
be achieved by 2030 for costs between 1,300 and 3,000 Euros per vehicle at 2014 
currency values.  Our baseline does not achieve such low GHG levels for ICE but does 
incorporate significant improvements and reductions, along with considerable increases 
in vehicle stocks and travel around the world.  
 
2.1 National ICE vehicle sales ban scenarios 
In our modeling tool, we define the parameters of an internal combustion engine (ICE) 
sales ban policy as one where non-plugin, ICE-powered vehicle sales go to zero in 
participating countries by 2040. Plug-in hybrids are assumed to be exempt from the 
sales ban, as well as commercial freight vehicles, emergency vehicles, and 2/3 wheelers. 
However, stricter bans are possible, which would presumably yield more reductions 
than we consider with these bounding conditions in this paper. 
 
In our analysis, we assume the policy begins to impact sales in 2030 as automobile 
manufacturers (OEMs) begin to gradually shift production. This assumption is informed 
by car manufacturers’ response to substantive bans on diesel engines in several 
European cities. A number of OEMs have pledged to cease production of all diesel 
powertrains within the next decade (IEA, 2018). One driving factor is a rapid consumer 
response. German sales of diesel vehicles fell by 20 percent in 2017 and continue to 
decline, and sales value of used diesel vehicles have plummeted. (Hockenos, 2018) U.K. 
diesel vehicles sales have fallen even more precipitously (Campbell, 2018). This is 
consistent with research findings that policies that discourage diesel sales and/or 
promote electric vehicles can be effective in encouraging rapid shifts from diesel engine 
to electric vehicle technology. (Brand, 2016)   
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Additionally, the idea of an anticipatory response to the policy is consistent with recent 
actions made by auto manufacturers after national commitments to phasing out ICEs 
became public. In fact, there is considerable action occurring today, and a major 
transition to PEV sales appears likely to be well underway by 2030.  For example, Volvo 
recently announced it will exclusively produce cars with some form of electric motor 
(hybrids, plug-in hybrids and/or full battery electric vehicles) beginning in 2019 (Pham). 
Larger producers such as General Motors, BMW, Renault-Nissan and most others have 
begun to roll out many more electric models and plan to ramp this up in coming years. 
As of early 2019, Daimler is planning for 10 plug-in models by 2022, BMW is planning for 
25 models by 2025, VW is aiming for 30 or more EVs and annual vehicle sales of 2 to 3 
million vehicles by 2025, and General Motors plans to offer at least 20 new fully electric 
models by 2023 (Marklines, Davies). These shifts are monumental due to the scale of 
these companies, but are not surprising given the trends unfolding in California, Europe, 
and China, all sizable, important automotive markets. In particular, China has 
aggressively pursued policies to increase the share of electric vehicles in the national 
PLDV stock. In 2018, more than one million light-duty EVs were sold in China (Green Car 
Congress, 2019), with EVs making up 2.2 percent of total PLDV stock (IEA, 2019).  
 
An important question, therefore, is whether these announcements indicate that bans 
already are having effect, and a steady glide path is assured toward zero ICE sales by 
2040. This is a difficult question but it is important to consider that there are literally 
thousands of ICE models sold around the world today, and even if manufacturers are 
producing dozens or even hundreds of plug-in models by 2030, this may not represent a 
steady glide path to zero ICE cars. National ICE car bans focused on a 2040 target date 
are not likely to have a significant impact on sales before 2030 because consumers do 
not appear to look that far ahead in their decision-making, and many automakers plan 
changes in platforms and tooling in six to eight year increments.  On the other hand, 
there could be a some type of psychological effect of knowing of a future ban on 
markets before 2030, and particularly if there are policies in place to support moving 
onto a substitution glide path (such as purchase incentives), then impacts before 2030 
are possible. We assume a slow, steady increase in PEV sales up to 2030 due to a 
combination of these effects, but then a much faster ramp up to 2040 as bans are well 
established and are “looming”, i.e. fall within planning horizons. 
 
Another key factor is the geographic range of bans – we assume they are first 
implemented in major car producing regions that have already announced intentions 
and are clearly moving in that direction, namely OECD Europe and China.  India has 
announced bans (for 2030) but has not taken any clear steps to signal that these policy 
pronouncements are serious or will be enforced or supported with other policies, so we 
do not include India in this first group.  
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We then consider a second group that includes India and other countries that are either 
considering bans or seem likely to do so if bans in the first group remain in play in the 
coming years. This second wave group includes India, the United States, Canada, Japan, 
South Korea, Australia and New Zealand – basically adding all of the other OECD 
countries outside of Europe and India.  Added to the first group, this represents the vast 
majority of light-duty vehicle production and sales today – though the share will decline 
over time as the rest of the world increases their sales rates and shares of global sales. 
  
In our last scenario, we assume that the rest of the world follows suit, but with a five-
year lag time. This group includes countries like Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and all the 
remaining countries of the world, in Asia, nearly all of Africa, and Latin America.  Thus, in 
this broader scenario, no ICE vehicles are sold anywhere in the world after 2045. 
 
Throughout all these scenarios, we assume a preservation of the “base case” projection 
of car sales and stock worldwide.  We use the IEA 4 Degrees sales projections which are 
forecast to grow from the current levels of around 95 million per year to nearly 150 
million by 2050 (Figure 2).  After 2030, much of projected vehicle sales growth occurs 
outside of OECD regions or China.  Based on this growth in non-OECD regions, global 
vehicle stocks are projected to grow from their current level of just over 1 billion to well 
over 2 billion by 2050.  It is possible that rising congestion in mega-cities in the non-
OECD will curb this projected growth. We consider this potential outcome as good 
subject for future research.  
 
Our analysis substitutes PEVs into this sales/stock projection; i.e., wherever ICE vehicles 
are banned and thus no longer sold, we assume that a vehicle purchase is still made but 
substituted by an electric vehicle or hydrogen fuel cell. This has a direct, complete 
impact on oil use (as long as electricity generation uses no oil) but does not necessarily 
cut CO2 emissions completely, since electricity generation triggers some emissions.   
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Figure 2. Global Light-duty Vehicle Sales by Region 
 
 
It is of course quite possible that individual car ownership trends might change over 
time, and deviate significantly from our business as usual assumptions used here. For 
example, a shift to PEVs could be accompanied by lower driving levels and a 
transformation of urban travel away from private automobiles, toward on-demand and 
shared mobility options. Automation may further move urban populations away from 
individual vehicle ownership to a higher reliance on “on demand” services that might 
become much less expensive (Jaffe, 2019). These effects would likely reduce overall car 
sales and stocks over time. They could render our projections about car stocks and 
energy use too high, and change the time frame and glide path toward an ICE ban 
future.  However, there are simply too many possible future scenarios to consider to be 
able to address them in this initial paper. We begin this first effort by sticking to a more 
traditional baseline future, to compare the effects of car bans as the only feature of 
change.  
 
In summary, we assume that the actions being taken by governments, in terms of 
policies, and manufacturers and in terms of product planning today are beginning to 
reflect some “back of mind” thinking on possible future ICE bans, but not yet sufficiently 
to put companies on a glide path toward those bans.  There will need to be many other 
policies in play to push markets in the right directions, at least through 2030.  This paper 
does not attempt to detail those, or conduct a policy modeling analysis of a wider range 
of sensitivity analysis.  We are focused on what the glide path from 2030 to 2040 might 
look like under a straightforward ICE ban implementation and how this would affect the 
stock of vehicles through 2040 and beyond, and thus oil use.  Specifically, we assume 
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LDV bans begin significantly to influence sales in all affected regions by 2030, with a 
ramp up to full market transformation by 2040. In this regard, we make a number of 
other specific assumptions: 
• LDV ICE bans are implemented completely by 2040 in covered countries, with 
the exception that in our global ban case, the countries added to that case 
achieve a ban in 2045.  
• The ban restricts non-plug-in vehicles, so there are some ICEs still, in the form of 
plug-in hybrids.  
• Stock turnover continues normally, meaning the last operating ICE vehicles are 
not phased out until 15-20 years after the ban date.  
• We consider a business-as-usual case with no bans, and 3 ban scenarios: 
o Bans only in those countries that currently seem most likely – namely the 
EU countries and China.  
o Bans extended to include India (which has made ban announcements) 
and the rest of the OECD (US/Japan/Korea/Canada/Australia/New 
Zealand) in addition to the EU and China.  
o Bans further extended to become globally by 2045, to capture the larger 
effect were the entire world to go along with the ban effort with a five-
year lag time given the high percentage of car manufacturers already 
located in ban regions. 
• Consumers and manufacturers see this date approaching and start to shift away 
from ICE cars much sooner, beginning in earnest in 2030. The period 2030-2039 
is handled as a transition period with a steady decline in ICE vehicle market 
shares in covered regions. 
• We take into account that other policies are already affecting PEV sales 
worldwide and we ramp up sales from today to 2030 following that path, which 
is a much slower rate than once the ban-related trends kick in in 2030. 
• LDV mobility and vehicle ownership are fully conserved; overall new vehicle 
sales, stocks, and kilometers of travel (Vkt) remain consistent across all 
scenarios. 
 
As mentioned, there are many reasons why the future may take a different course than 
we depict here. For example, LDV sales reach 160 million by 2050, which may not occur 
if the world moves to a “shared mobility” ride-hailing framework with far fewer vehicles 
used far more intensively, providing 12 or more hours of daily commercial service. We 
are also aware of the possibility ever-rising car sales and stocks could result in traffic 
congestion so severe that the system is unsustainable from that point of view, which 
could result in massive shifts away from car use. There could also be very different 
population and/or GDP evolution, resulting in different car ownership from those 
drivers.  
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2.2 Baseline Scenario 
To create a baseline scenario, we align with projections from the IEA ETP 2017 New 
Policies Scenario, which in turn is consistent with IEA’s “4 Degree Scenario” work from 
its World Energy Outlook forecasting.  Under this baseline scenario, car sales and stock 
growth are robust into the future, and there are some electric vehicle sales into the 
future in this scenario. Worldwide, sales rise from about 95 million in 2018 to 160 
million by 2050, with stocks rising from 1.1 billion to 2.3 billion over this time. PEV sales 
rise from around 3 million in 2020 to 33 million in 2050 (or 20% market share), and 
stocks from 10 million to 280 million, or about 12% of LDV stocks. Along with strong 
increases in average new LDV fuel economy over this period, the net result is relatively 
small increase in transport oil use – from around 22 million barrels/day in 2020 to 24 
million in 2050.  This actually begins to decline after a 2045 peak of 25 million b/d, so 
there is an LDV oil peak even in the baseline, but it is better termed “flat oil” since it 
does not decline much after this point, but rather remains steady.  
 
2.3 Carbon Emissions Calculation Methodology  
We also use our modeling tool to estimate well-to-wheel GHG (as CO2-equivalent) 
emissions from LDVs in this analysis. This is a straightforward calculation, with a CO2 
coefficient for gasoline, diesel, and electricity in each year, in each country/region, all 
contained within the model. We use the International Energy Agency’s projections for 
electricity CO2 intensity under their 2 degrees scenario.  IEA calculates that CO2 
emissions per kWh of electricity generation are projected to decline in all countries in 
the 2DS scenario (IEA, 2018). We use the 2DS scenario for our base projections in all 
scenarios, but also consider the differences from using RTS carbon intensity projections. 
Our operating assumption is that decarbonization in the utility sector is generally taking 
place at a more rapid pace than in the transportation sector and thus a political 
atmosphere that would encourage ICE bans would likely also have consistent carbon 
reduction policies in the utility sector.   
3. Results  
The results from our three different ICE engine ban scenarios on global vehicle sales by 
engine type is shown in Figure 3. Changes in sales of PEVs between 2020 and 2065 are a 
function of the regional car bans in place for each scenario.  With fully effective bans by 
2040 in OECD Europe and China, about 60 million PEVs are sold, displacing a similar 
number of ICE vehicles.  With the rest of the OECD 
(US/Canada/Japan/Korea/Australia/New Zealand) and India added, the number rises to 
nearly 100 million.  If the entire rest-of-world followed, with a five year time lag (so that 
all ICEs are banned worldwide by 2045), there would be sales of nearly 160 million PEVs 
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in that year. In each scenario, after the ban year, the share of PEVs remains stable and 
grows just as a function of overall LDV sales.   
 
Figure 3. Global Plug-in Electric Vehicle Sales, Four Scenarios 
 
 
Significantly, the rate of change promoted by national ICE sales bans slows by the rate of 
vehicle stock turnover (Figure 4). By 2040, bans in OECD-Europe and China result in 
about a 20% PEV stock share of all LDVs (400 million out of 2 billion).  Even with bans 
worldwide, plug-in stocks only approach one third of the total stock.  This share then 
increases rapidly over time: in the global scenario, by 2050 PEVs reach 85% of the global 
LDV stock (about 2 billion out of 2.3 billion LDVs). By 2060 the transition is about 
complete. The slow rate of turnover of the existing car fleet dampens the effectiveness 
of ICE ban policies to affect oil use and carbon emissions within the 2050 time frame.  
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Figure 4. Global PLDV Stock Shares Resulting from Sales Projections 
 
 
There are policies that can speed the rate of stock turnover, such as the Obama 
administration’s cash for clunkers program.  Such policies can retire older vehicles early 
and incentivize purchases of sustainable new vehicles (Mian and Sufi, 2012). However, 
one study indicates that incentivized retirement policies can be expensive and eliminate 
vehicles that might have been retired anyway within a few years (Dews, 2013). Such 
programs are still popular with policy makers. In the fall of 2019, U.S. Senator Chuck 
Schumer D-NY unveiled a plan that proposed to offer cash vouchers to Americans with 
older vehicles of at least eight years old to shift to a new cleaner vehicle such as an 
electric vehicle, plug-in hybrid, or fuel-call car (Shepardson, 2019).   
 
There are other potential effects of ICE ban policies that are difficult to gauge. For 
example, electric light duty vehicles have substantially reduced energy and operational 
costs versus the average ICE, in some cases exhibiting over a 50% reduction in per mile 
costs (IEA GEVO, 2018).  A steep reduction in the cost to drive could result in a rebound 
effect, where consumers are less motivated to curtail Vkt (vehicle kilometers traveled) 
due to a dampened price signal.  While rebound effects from reduced price signals were 
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not explicitly included in this research, they should be considered as potential subjects 
for future inquiry. 
 
The net effects on LDV oil demand from the various scenarios are shown in Figure 5.  
The policy begins to save oil around 2030 and achieves significant savings by 2040, given 
the ramp-up.  By 2040, the impact ranges from 2 to 6 million barrels per day depending 
on the scenario.  By 2050 it reaches around 5 million barrels per day in the OECD-
Eur/China scenario and nearly 15 million in the global scenario. Oil use levels off in the 
global ban scenario after 2050, as the remaining PHEVs continue to consume some oil.  
 
Figure 5. ICE Sales Ban Oil Demand Impacts (Oil Use in LDVs Globally) 
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Applying these reductions in transport oil use, we incorporate our ICE ban scenario 
results into projections for total global oil demand. Our ICE ban scenarios have a modest 
impact compared to the baseline reference case where oil demand continues to rise 
until 2045 and then peaks. As shown in Figure 6, a limited ICE engine ban in OECD-
Europe and China in 2040 is sufficient to flatten the rise in total global oil demand and 
only triggers peak in oil use in the 2040s.  Eventually, however, rising population growth 
undermines this flattening of oil use into the 2050s and beyond. By contrast, our 
extended scenario including all OECD countries, China and India, quickly produces a 
peak in global oil demand, beginning around 2035.  The global ban scenario also triggers 
this peak in the 2030-2035 time frame, and causes it to become much more pronounced 
after 2040, with demand dropping below 2015 levels by 2050.  
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Figure 6. ICE Engine Ban Scenarios and Global Oil Use 
 
The impacts of the ICE ban scenarios on light-duty vehicle CO2 emissions are significant 
after 2035 (Figure 7). Even in the Baseline scenario, global LDV CO2 emissions drop from 
2040 onward as travel growth is more than offset by efficiency improvements and some 
shifts to electric vehicles.  In the most limited ban scenario covering just OECD Europe 
and China, CO2 emissions by 2060 drop down to their 2010 level, around 3000 
megatonnes. Adding India brings this to 2000 by 2060, and adding the rest of the world 
results in it reaching around 500 megatonnes, on the order of 80% below 1990 emission 
levels.   
 
Achieving these very low levels of CO2 is due both to the shifts to electric vehicles (and 
electricity). Our findings show that if electricity is decarbonized at a rapid rate around 
the world after 2030, it can seriously accelerate the benefit of shifting to PEVs in line 
with IEA’s ETP 2 Degrees Scenario.  In a scenario with slower decarbonization of the 
electric sector, the change in emissions consequences of ICE engine bans would be more 
limited, especially in the 2040-2050 time frame.   
 
Our modeling suggests that policies related to ICE engine bans should be made hand to 
hand with policies reducing the use of carbon intensive fuels in the power generation 
sector either by substituting for clean energy or by adding carbon capture and 
sequestration.  
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Figure 7. LDV CO2e GHG Emissions 
  
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
We find that several countries and localities are considering ICE sales bans as a means to 
address air pollution and mitigate rising greenhouse gas emissions, while reducing 
national reliance on oil products. We utilize a sales/stock/travel scenario spreadsheet 
tool calibrated to align with the International Energy Agency’s bottom-up, transport 
model MoMo to analyze the impact of national bans on new sales of light-duty ICE 
passenger cars.  
 
We find the proposed ICE sales bans in Europe and China could eventually reduce about 
5.5 mmboe/d of oil use by 2050. Taken alone, this erosion of demand would not have 
the potential to trigger peak global oil use quickly. A full global ban on ICE engine sales 
would have a more significant impact on global oil use, eliminating about 15 million b/d 
of demand after 2050 and creating a permanent peaking and sustained downturn in oil 
use. Our results imply that the impact of proposed ICE engine sales bans on oil 
businesses could be a delayed one that still leaves room for both production of legacy 
assets and even potentially new oil finds, though there will likely be other policies and 
circumstances that will have additional impacts.  
 
Another implication of these findings is that other, additional complementary policies 
will be needed to supplement national ICE engine bans for a timely reduction of oil use 
and related carbon emissions to stabilize climatic change.  Limited ICE engine bans in 
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Europe and China are likely not sufficient to bring global emissions down to levels 
needed to limit global warming to the 2 degrees Celsius target consistent with the Paris 
agreement. Moreover, to be most effective, they should be coupled with deep 
decarbonization of the power generation sector. If coupled with a decarbonized electric 
grid, a global sales ban on ICE engines could bring carbon emissions from light duty 
passenger vehicles to zero by 2060.   
  
National ICE engine bans could be easier to implement at scale than closing small urban 
pedestrian centers to passenger car traffic, but cities can still play a strong role in 
reducing transport emissions. We recommend that cities look at a wider array of policies 
to combine with a ban on ICE engines in urban centers in their efforts to reduce carbon 
emissions including land use changes that encourage use of public transit, walking, and 
bicycling. Policies aimed to decarbonize the freight sector via alternative fuels and 
optimization technologies are another promising avenue to complement ICE bans on 
passenger vehicles.  
 
There are a number of potential subjects for future inquiry. One would be to better 
understand how quickly cities could transform themselves and rapidly cut car use, based 
on the fastest historical cases (such as Copenhagen).  Another would be to consider how 
soon a national ICE ban would begin to affect behavior, i.e. if passenger vehicle owners 
would anticipate the ban and shift their purchases away from ICE engine cars up to a 
decade in advance of the target date, given the clear commitment. The pace of Europe’s 
current abandonment of diesel engine vehicles might shed some light on this notion. In 
Europe, sales of diesel engine cars have plummeted in the past year as Germany and 
other countries have mooted banning their use in urban settings.  
 
Discussion of bans is currently taking place somewhat haphazardly but could be better 
integrated into global governance structures of global climate negotiations. In 
particular, nationally determined individual reduction pledges should include both 
realistic timelines for an outright or partial ban of ICE engines sales, increased 
investment for public transport expansion plans, and smart urban design and transit-
oriented development to increase accessibility while lowering dependence on individual 
passenger car use.  
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